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Replacing safe havens with 
a safe system
by Jonathan M Winer
At the recent Sixteenth International Symposium on Economic Crime, Jonathan 
Winer analysed the background to recent worldwide financial services collapses. The 
text of Mr Winer's presentation is reproduced here.
I n recent weeks, we have had a major crash in the middle of the financial services electronic highway, and hundreds of millions of people are already feeling the shock trom the 
impact, even if they were nowhere near the site of the impact in 
Moscow.
The current Russian crisis simultaneously poses threats to the 
world's capital markets, Eurasian political stability and 
democracy in the Newly Independent States, in addition to the 
viability of the market reforms the International Monetary Fund 
has been seeking to put in place all over the earth. It provides a 
perfect case history of the relevance of the theme of this 
conference, The Prevention and Control oj Economic Crime Against 
Governments, to both national and international security'.
CAUSES OF THE RUSSIAN CRISIS
There have been many analyses of the causes of the recent 
Russia crisis. Its relationship to the problem of economic crime 
provides a window into vulnerabilities in our system of financial 
supervision, regulation, and enforcement that are literally 
global.
For years, analysts have suggested that the viability of Russian 
reform was threatened by Russia's lack of transparency, 
inadequate regulation, inadequate law enforcement, corruption 
and organized crime. They noted that financial crime 
threatened the integrity of Russia's financial systems and 
simultaneously fuelled many other types of criminal activity, 
discouraged foreign investment, facilitated capital flight, and 
robbed Russia of the resources it needed to move forward with 
privatization and modernization.
But despite the profound flaws of its political, juridical and 
financial systems, Russia is not itself the problem. Russia is not 
unique; it is not even that unusual. The recent global raging bear 
market is merely the freshest reminder that global capital flows 
and global technologies have out-paced the ability of 
governments to regulate or to enforce the rules necessary for 
efficient markets. Instead, in country after country, we see 
financial discontinuities, anomalies, inadequate regulation, and 
fraud, leaving the world subject instead to sudden, wild 
gyrations in financial markets.
Mexico has had many of the same problems in its political 
and financial systems as Russia has had, with as much 
corruption in evidence as transparency and regulatory integrity 
has been missing. Mexico, like Russia, was a miracle of the 
marketplace, until in early 1995, the miracle proved mirage and 
the bailouts began. Japan's financial system singularly has little
transparency, poor auditing, weak regulatory controls, and the 
shared participation of its banks and its local form of organized 
crime, the Yakuza, in real estate speculation. For much of the 
1990s, Japan has been in a slow free-fall, which continues to 
this day. Last year, what was then called the Asian Financial Flu 
spread through Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand. 
Each of these financial sector collapses, like the most recent 
Russian problem, took place in environments that featured poor 
regulation, weak law enforcement, little financial transparency, a 
fair degree of official corruption, and no laws against laundering 
money.
Eesser known financial collapses have had similar features. 
For example, the collapse in 1995 of Latvia's largest commercial 
bank occurred because the bank had been controlled by a 
criminal group, that used the bank to make bad loans to its front 
companies and defrauded the bank's accounts of as much as 
$40m. That collapse provoked a major financial crisis in Latvia, 
contributed to a change in the government, and forced Latvia to 
seek short-term assistance from the International Monetary 
Fund (see President's International Crime Control Strategy, The 
White House, May 1998, p. 18). Similarly, a series of pyramid or 
'Ponzi' schemes in Albania last year stripped the country of 
more than $2 50m in capital, causing the government to 
collapse, as hundreds of thousands of impoverished refugees 
fled to Italy.
The flaws in our current system of governance in the area of 
international financial service activities should not surprise us. 
As technology globalized financial markets beyond national 
borders, governments, regulators and law enforcement agencies 
stayed at home, their responsibilities most often limited to 
overseeing domestic activities of entities and markets. While 
anyone with a computer, modem and bank account had the 
ability to move funds throughout every jurisdiction in the world, 
no government regulator or law enforcement agency was 
simultaneously granted the ability to trace funds through any 
jurisdiction but its own.
We created a financial services electronic highway without 
enforceable speed limits and without highway patrols. The 
recent Russian crack-up has thrown debris all over that highway, 
causing all kinds of collateral damage to everyone else relying on 
the same infrastructure to move around, before the repair crews 
had completed their work on Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and 
Japan. As we clean up from this latest major accident, we need 
to think about what kind of rules we can put in place now to 
reduce the risk of additional accidents happening while we are 
still undertaking repairs. We need also to be working on longer-
term changes to impose enough regulation and enforcement 
within the global financial services system to ensure a reasonable 
level of protection for all its billions of individual and corporate 
users, regardless of where they are located.
SMOKE SIGNALS
In analysing what has gone wrong, it may be useful to look at 
what was said about the problem before a crack-up actually 
occurred, in a test case like Russia. Switching metaphors, in
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reviewing the diagnosis of the patient before the heart attack, it 
may be easier to recognize what kind of measures could have 
been undertaken as preventive medicine in the comfort of 
home, rather than as emergency surgery in the field. In the case 
of Russia, the diagnosis was made years ago and prescriptions 
provided, but then largely ignored by doctor and patient alike. 
In March 1996, in its annual report on drug trafficking and 
money-laundering, the US State Department diagnosed the 
problem in Russia as follows:
'Criminal and fraudulent activities in the Russian banking sector and 
the prevention of such activities have serious potential implications Jbr 
the safety and soundness of the banking system and consumer confidence 
in the commercial banks as an integral institutional component of a 
market economy' (US Department of State, International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report, March 1996, p. 581).
A year later, State warned that:
'continued growth of economic crimes in the financial sector, 
inefficient tax and government enforcement mechanisms, and the 
prevalence of capital flight suggest significant money-laundering 
activities that warrants immediate remedial action by Russian 
authorities. The shadow economy is a breeding ground for corruption, 
money-laundering, and a source for further criminality, criminal, and 
organized crime' (International Narcotics Control Report, March 
1998, p. 579).
The report emphasized the considerable weight that off-shore 
business activity by Russians was imposing on Russia's financial 
services system, noting that billions of dollars in credit were 
being extended by Russian entities as overseas loans which 
appeared to be unregistered capital flight.
In March 1998, State again warned that 'the volume of 
Russian offshore business activity is high', specifying that this 
activity was taking place in such offshore zones as Ireland, the 
UK dependencies in Europe, offshore locations in the 
Caribbean and the Pacific, creating a serious enforcement7 o
problem that made tracing the funds increasingly impossible 
(International Narcotics Strategy Reports, March 1998, p. 645 648.
The State Department's reports on Russia emphasized 
inadequate regulation and enforcement at home, capital flight, 
and the use of offshore financial havens overseas. As a result, 
Russian law enforcement could not investigate and prosecute 
financial crime and money-laundering with an international 
dimension. In making these observations, was the State 
Department focusing on a distinctly Russian problem, or one of 
more universal applicability?
Information contributing to answering that question is 
answerable through reviewing the banking registries of the 
islands of the South Pacific, one of the new centers of the 
world's off-shore industry and, not coincidentally, home to a 
large percentage of Russia's offshore banks.
BANKERS OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC
The post-colonial South Pacific is home to a number of young 
countries characterized by tiny populations, limited 
governmental resources, and economic monocultures. These 
countries typically have no industry and few comparative 
advantages apart from the natural resource of bird guano 
phosphates and tourism. Yet over the last few years, these atolls 
have sprouted vigorous financial services industries, whose sole 
purpose would seem to be financial crime.
Cook Islands
Recently, the Department of State reviewed a group of 
offshore entities based in the Cook Islands, a group of 1 5 coral 
islands in the heart of the South Pacific, spread over an area the 
size of India, with a population of just 18,000 souls and 3,000 
separate, registered, anonymous off-shore trusts. The review 
revealed connections between this village-sized 'nation-state', 
organized crime, Russia, and the some of the most notorious 
financial players in the Asia Pacific region.
The first names among the Cook Islands' bankers to leap out 
to an American reviewer were those belonging to a well-known 
Italian family under investigation by Italian authorities for 
numerous company offenses and bankruptcies, frauds, assaults, 
conspiracies, receiving, contraband, currency and banking 
offences.
Also on the list of Cook Island bankers were certain Brazilian 
politicians under investigation in Brazil for narcotics money- 
laundering. The list included too the names of six Paraguayans, 
several Russian speakers operating out of Cyprus and a number 
of Indonesian banks, including the now notorious Lippo Group, 
allegedly involved with money-laundering and illegal campaign 
contributions in connection with the last round of American 
presidential elections.
Naura
Nauru, another nation of 18,000 people in the middle of the 
South Pacific, whose economy has largely been built on the 
export of bird guano, today has some 288 licensed offshore 
banks. Among its offshore bankers are a Latvian gentleman 
under investigation in Riga for allegedly stealing $20m, a 
number of Ukrainians and Russians, the notorious Dragon 
Bank, alleged to have engaged in massive financial crime and 
money-laundering, before its license was revoked in 1997, a 
Malaysian investigated recently for being a conduit for 
laundering drug profits from the Cali cocaine cartel in 
Colombia, and an Australian in the business of transiting large
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sums of Iranian currency.
Samoa
In Samoa, the newly created offshore industry features only 
15 offshore banks. This small sector, however, already includes 
among its bankers a Russian who travels on Honduran and 
Russian passports, and who has some 300 offshore companies 
also registered in Samoa. Its other bankers include a Greek and 
a Russian arrested in Malta for operating an unlicensed bank, 
misappropriation of funds and forgery, a Swiss banker known 
unfavorably to Swiss authorities, a Ukrainian-Israeli, a Lebanese 
based in Beirut, another gentleman with a Swiss criminal 
record, some people whose addresses in the US turned out to
be false, and a Russian individual who is currently in the custody 
of European law enforcement.
As this summary suggests, the offshore bankers of the South 
Pacific include a fair number of criminals, operating in these tiny 
jurisdictions precisely because they are tiny, under-regulated, 
and protected from international law enforcement. Years ago, 
the location of these islands would have made them extremely 
undesirable sites for international finance, because the lack of 
infrastructure would have made financial dealings through themo o
slow, inefficient, and unreliable. Todav, every one of these 
jurisdictions is available for use to anyone with an Internet 
address, with transactions that go through their institutions 
treated no differently by the world's financial services industry 
than transactions that go through the major banks of Paris, 
Tokyo, London, Hamburg, and New York. These jurisdictions 
are able to attract the business of money-launderers and other 
criminals because they have the technical advantages of the major 
financial centers   access in real time to the world's financial 
markets and investments, without the disadvantages   oversight, 
regulation, law enforcement, transparency.
The legal regimes in these mini-states that are useful for 
criminals are indistinguishable from those useful for terrorists, 
for drug-traffickers, for fraudsters, for tax evasion and for capital 
flight. The environment for protecting capital flight and for tax 
evasion is indistinguishable from the environment suited for 
serious financial crime. Financial crime of whatever nature 
breeds in the same kind of house, breathes the same kind of air, 
procreates and flourishes under the same kinds of legal and 
bureaucratic frameworks.
The globalized economy has intensified this problem, by 
blurring to near obliteration the borders between domestic and 
foreign financial activity. What is really offshore in a globalized 
economy? What is really onshore? How can anyone tell the 
difference? If 'offshore' has no rules, why should anyone live by 
the rules 'onshore' when all it takes to go 'offshore' is a modem
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and a bank account? Under these circumstances, what rules 
should exist for 'offshore' financial institutions to ensure that 
they do not undermine the safety and soundness of institutions 
that are 'onshore'? If New York and Vanuatu have the same 
electronic access to financial markets, how might we develop 
rules that take into account the differences in the regulatory 
schemes that govern them?
on the
_rpt/bcci/index.<
\ account of BCCI's use of offshore havens to commit financial crime is 
contained in The BCCI Affair: A report to the Committee on Foreign Relations US 
Senate by Senators John Kerry and Hank Brown (December 1992); available on the 
above site.
fact that it had a $5 billion hole in its books that left it with no 
working capital. As regulators and law enforcement officials 
ultimately proved, BCCI did so by hiding the losses in 
subsidiaries in the Caymans and the Dutch Antilles. Ten years 
later, when Daiwa bank suffered massive losses in its 
commodities trading operations, it too turned to the offshore 
world to hide its losses, a scheme that was only discovered not 
by effective bank regulation, but because one of the insiders 
became an informant for prosecutors. The Venezuelan banking 
crisis of the mid-1990s went through the same process of seeing 
massive capital losses from insider lending being hidden through 
offshore operations in the nearby Antilles. Japan's crisis has had 
similar patterns: bad loans, fraud and an account manipulation 
overseas to keep the day of reckoning at bay.
The sudden institutional collapses of a BCCI, a Barings 
Investment Bank, or a Credit Lyonnais, which hid losses of some 
$35 billion 'offshore' in nearby Luxembourg, do not merely 
damage shareholders, suddenly wiping out capital. They do not 
merely devastate depositors and creditors and leave, in most
cases, losses so large that governments and their taxpayers are
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required to bail out the victims. They have been warning signals, 
over the past decade, of the risks of an unregulated international 
financial services sector that continues to demonstrate its 
inability to police itself. They have been predictors of the kinds 
of instabilities that we have since seen affect entire countries and 
entire regions, and which have now impacted'the capital markets 
of the entire world.
The current financial crisis in Russia is thus best viewed as 
merely the latest wave in a cascade that requires systematic 
changes in how we all do business. The international financial 
markets move money through countries that have excellent 
record-keeping, regulatory, and auditing practices, and through 
countries that have essentially none, treating all the electronic 
digits as if they are the same, regardless of the route they take on 
the way to where they are reinvested. This breathtaking 
egalitarianism has, in a number of cases, masked underlying 
financial realities, so that money has appeared to exist when in 
fact the underlying capital was no longer available. The amazing 
global infrastructure for moving money has been tripped up 
because the infrastructure cannot see whether these electronic 
digits adequately represent reality in the world outside.
For us to continue to feel safety and reliability in the electronic 
digits that now represent the world's wealth, we 
need to strengthen our systems of regulation and 
enforcement. They need to be sufficiently 
transparent to provide us with good warning 
signals when things are going wrong, whether what 
is going wrong relates to a single transaction, to a
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business, or to a nation's entire economy.
The answers to these questions are of interest not only to the 
South Pacific, Caribbean and Mediterranean financial 
havens, but to every government and to every major financial 
services sector in the world.
MOUNTING LOSSES
These issues began to be raised in the mid-1980s, when the 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International wanted to hide the
TAKING THE CURE
In broad outline, the principles for action have largely already 
largely been identified and are contained in the FATF's 40 
Recommendations, the CFATF's 19 Recommendations, the 
Organization of American States (OAS) Model Regulations, the 
European directive on money-laundering (Directive 9f/308, OJ 
1991 LI66/77), and the Basle Principles. In some countries, 
these principles have yet to be legislated. In others, they are 
matters of law, but not of implementation. Some of the most
important near-term actions include:
(1) Broadening money-laundering legislation beyond narcotics 
to the widest group of predicate criminal offenses.
(2) Eliminating systemic weaknesses, through ensuring that 
financial services firms maintain adequate records, know 
their customers, and report suspicious transactions.
(3) Engaging in adequate enforcement actions, such as revoking 
licenses of institutions that do not maintain adequate 
records or report suspicious transactions, or whose overseas 
activities reflect involvement in money-laundering or 
financial crime.
(4) Regulating exchange houses and remittance systems, such as 
the 'hundi', 'hawala', and 'Chop' systems in the Middle 
East, South and East Asia, as well as the 'cambios' of Latin 
America.
(4) Applying transparency, anti-money-laundering, and 
financial crime enforcement mechanisms to non-bank 
financial services sectors, including investment banks, 
insurance, commodities trading, derivatives, international 
business corporations, offshore banks, and assets held by 
foreign trusts.
(5) Completing the building of a web of intelligence and 
information sharing on financial crime, through the further 
development of FUIs that meet Egmont Group standards, 
and which are able to share information with one another 
through the Egmont Group secure website.
Beyond these standard elements for next steps, are some 
possible innovations that would exceed current international 
practice, to provide greater reach for law enforcement and less 
impunity for financial criminals. These steps include the 
following.
Asserting universal jurisdiction over and access to records
No nation can protect its citizens if they do business with 
someone whose activities, records, property, and person remain 
beyond the government's reach. The US has long asserted very 
broad jurisdiction over the documents it needs from financial 
services providers when it comes to criminal prosecutions, 
through a doctrine that is sometimes known as the 'Bank of 
Nova Scotia' doctrine, for the money-laundering case where it 
first arose. Mutual legal assistance treaties are a major new 
mechanism by which countries may co-operate with one another 
in retrieving essential evidence of financial crimes. The UN 
Convention on Organized Crime, currently under negotiation in 
Vienna, will create a universal system for mutual legal assistance 
in cases involving serious organized financial crime. But
o o
countries can exercise self-help as well, making the right to do 
business in their country contingent on agreement to make 
records available to law enforcement in connection with 
investigations of serious crime. Such a provision, if universally 
adopted, would do much to protect shareholders, depositors, 
and creditors from having no remedy in the event of something
O J O
going wrong. Simultaneously, the Group of Eight and the 
Council of Europe need to complete their work on the problem 
of 'high tech crime'. Currently, both groups are considering 
rules to ensure that Internet service providers and the financial 
services infrastructures retain records of traffic for a sufficient 
period so as to permit law enforcement and regulators to
reconstruct financial transactions when something has gone 
wrong. In addition, they are seeking to construct universal 
principles tor the assertion of jurisdiction, and mechanisms to 
trap and trace electronic transactions, in cases involving trans- 
national crime. Adoption of such universal rules will be 
necessary to reduce the threat posed if some jurisdictions do not 
require records to be maintained, or do not permit records 
maintained in their jurisdiction to be accessed, in cases involving 
financial crime.
Refusing to accept bank secrecy in cases involving 
financial crime
Nations cannot protect their citizens from financial crime if 
financial criminals are able to shield their criminal conduct 
through the use of bank secrecy. Jurisdictions that do not permit 
law enforcement to gain access to financial records in cases 
involving allegations of criminal conduct turn themselves into 
safe havens for financial criminals. Just as the EU has sued its 
member, Austria, to stop its issuance of anonymous banking 
accounts, the Financial Action Task Force and other 
international bodies need to consider taking appropriate 
measures to sanction countries that have become safe havens for 
financial criminals. Such sanctions need not be anything that 
would impair the ability of financial markets to function 
normally. When the Seychelles developed a package of economic- 
citizenship that purported to include protecting criminal 
proceeds from international law enforcement, the Financial 
Action Task Force asked all its members to treat transactions 
with the Seychelles as 'suspicious transactions', requiring 
immediate referral to law enforcement. Such an approach could 
develop into a two-tier system for international banking 
transactions: the top tier, including countries that meet the FATE 
recommendations, would have their transactions treated 
normally. Countries not permitting overseas regulators or law 
enforcement to have access to financial records would have their 
transactions subjected to additional regulatory controls. The 
most egregious would be subject to an automatic presumption 
that the transaction is suspicious, to be stored and analyzed by 
national FIUs. This type of two-tier system would reflect the 
actual risks to the global financial system inherent in having 
portions of that system act as black holes out of which 
information may not be recovered.
Eliminating differential treatment of offshore 
transactions
The offshore concept is based on a notion that what is 
necessary to regulate transactions involving the citizens of one's 
own country is not necessary in handling transactions involving 
the citizens of other nations. Its impact has been to encourage 
some financial institutions deliberately to structure themselves 
so that they are not regulated by anyone. Recently one such 
institution, Caymanx Bank, structured itself so that its 
operations in the Isle of Man were offshore to the Isle of Man, 
because it was a subsidiary of an institution in the Caymans. It 
was also offshore to the Caymans, because it was only doing 
business in the Isle of Man. As a result, its activities were 
effectively free of regulation, and its clients' records were 
advertised on the Internet as being free of oversight by the
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authorities of any jurisdiction. Whatever the economic 
justification for such differential treatment in the past, when 
national laws imposed tariffs on many forms of economic 
activity, treating as offshore anyone's transactions in any 
institution one licenses makes no sense. Such differential 
treatment is inappropriate now that everyone is using the same 
technological infrastructure, and when it is increasingly difficult
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to determine the actual national origin or citizenship of any
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individual or corporate user of this global system. We should be 
moving towards an international system where 'offshore' means
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the same as 'onshore', requiring the same regulations, the same 
access to records, the same law enforcement. Over time, 
jurisdictions that continue to offer under-regulated 'offshore' 
services will develop reputational problems that drive off 
legitimate businesses in any case. But in the meantime, to 
protect ourselves from the consequences of the abuses inherent 
in offshore financial services, firms based in offshore 
jurisdictions which are inadequately regulated should be 
subjected to additional due diligence by major clearinghouse 
banks.
Eliminating the 'it's only tax evasion' loophole
One of the great difficulties in developing information on a 
timely basis in financial crime cases is the problem of proving 
that money hidden in shell companies, international business 
corporations, or trusts, is the proceeds of criminal activity, 
rather than 'mere tax evasion.' In the US, some of the most 
important federal prosecutions of serious organized crime 
figures responsible for contract killings, drug-trafficking, and 
other extraordinarily serious crime, have only succeeded through 
the making of tax cases. In such domestic organized crime 
prosecutions, the inability of criminals to explain where their 
money came from and the clear frauds involved in their handling 
of the funds, made criminal prosecutions successful. By contrast, 
the generally accepted principle that there is nothing wrong with 
handling mere 'tax evasion' money offshore has created a swamp 
in which financial criminals breed. Nations could eliminate the 
'tax evasion' loophole through three techniques:
(1) adding tax evasion to the list of predicate offenses for 
money-laundering in their own anti-money-laundering 
laws;
(2) including tax evasion among the grounds for the elimination 
of bank secrecy in the provision of documents to law 
enforcement: and
(3) amending mutual legal assistance agreements to include tax 
offenses.
If such an approach became generally accepted, nations that 
continued to make themselves available for tax evasion aimed at 
other countries might well find that the potential damage to 
their reputation from remaining outside this new system 
outweighed the potential income from continuing to offer these
Co-operating in repatriation of assets and broadening 
civil remedies
Too often, victims of financial crime find themselves unable to 
reach the assets of those who have victimized them. 
Governments need to look at mechanisms to permit early 
immobilization of assets of financial criminals and mutual 
assistance in ensuring that the immobilization is international, 
not merely domestic.
Governments should consider assigning agents from several 
law enforcement agencies to work together in a task force
o o
approach against particular targets. They may also wish to 
consider providing for an adequate array of civil causes of action 
for victims of financial crime, against institutions who have 
facilitated the crime, as well as against the actual perpetrators. 
Governments may wish to determine where and when financial 
institutions doing business in their countries should be held at 
risk for losses to financial criminals occasioned through the use
o
of their institutions. Failure to adopt and implement 
mechanisms to ensure the 'know your customer' principle, in a 
case where the 'customer' proved to be engaging in a pattern or 
practice of fraudulent activity, could lead to civil liability to 
victims. Such a finding of civil liability could in turn lead to 
enhanced compliance practices, on the part not only of the first 
financial services firm unfortunate enough to become the test 
case, but by becoming the basis of enhanced compliance 
throughout the industry.
OUT OF REACH
No nation can protect its citi/.ens if they do business with someone 
whose activities, records, property and person remain beyond the 
government's reach.
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Linking future global financial assistance to 
strengthened supervision and enforcement
The IMF, the US and Europe have provided billions to Russia 
without tying this assistance to enhanced rule of law, law 
enforcement and financial regulation. Future global economic 
assistance to any country or region needs to connect law 
enforcement and regulatory reform with economic reform. This 
need not involve conditionality, but instead concurrent initiatives 
such as agreement to strengthen the role of central banks in 
auditing and inspecting the banks they regulate and to further 
protect them from political influence. Such audits could help 
ensure that central banks enforce compliance with law, as well as 
with safety and soundness provisions consistent with 
international standards. Among the actions to be undertaken 
would be establishing public, transparent professional standards 
for such industries as accountants, auditors, engineers, property 
appraisers, insurance and financial service companies, and
requirements for the issuance and regular renewal of business 
licenses and permits. The International Monetary Fund could 
play an especially helpful role here, by insisting upon such 
measures as core elements of its lending and programmatic 
support to countries in transition or in crisis.
Legislating transparency in government and public 
disclosure for public officials
Transparent government procurement and decision-making 
inhibits bribery and corruption, important factors in criminal 
exploitation of financial systems and institutions. The adoption 
of mechanisms to increase the integrity of governments and 
public officials in these areas are closely related to mechanisms 
that increase the integrity of the financial systems used by the 
public sector and private sectors alike. Efforts under way at the 
OECD and in Central Europe and Latin America, to combat 
corruption through the mechanisms of the Council of Europe 
and the OAS, could be supplemented by commitments by every 
nation to the principles of transparency in government. Such 
transparency might well make it easier tor nations to take the 
other steps needed to combat financial crime, by attenuating the 
ability of would-be financial criminals to purchase the kind of 
legislative environment needed to facilitate their activities. 
During the next few months, the US will be undertaking new 
initiatives to promote anti-corruption standards in other parts of 
the world, perhaps through a global instrument that 
incorporates the work already undertaken at the OECD, OAS, 
and Council of Europe, incorporating a mutual assessment 
process.
GETTING THERE
Having a carefully developed recipe provides guidance to the 
cook, but the proof of the pudding is in the eating. The 
proposals articulated here represent the ingredients of a policy 
that will be fed to hungry policymakers in the coming months 
under the pressure of a series of external deadlines as inexorable 
as the progression of breakfast, lunch and dinner. It remains to 
be seen which of the courses the cooks have been sweating overo
back in the kitchen will prove most palatable when served up at 
table.
Eet us begin with the mandate of the Birmingham Summit of 
the Eight of May 13 15, 1998. There the summit leaders of the 
eight industrialized nations warned 'there must be no safe havens 
either for criminals or for their money.' They committed the 
Eight to take vigorous action against the problem through a 
series of steps, including:
  The negotiation within the next two years of an effective UN 
convention against trans-national organized crime that will 
provide our law enforcement authorities with the additional 
tools they need.
  Implementing rapidly ten principles and a ten-point action 
plan agreed by our ministers on high tech crime, including the 
creation of a 24-hour-a-day team of experts in each country 
to assist one another in cases involving high tech crime, seveno o '
days a week, 365 days a year. To combat financial crime, 
including abuse of the Internet and other new technologies, 
the summit leaders called for close co-operation with industry 
to reach agreement on a legal framework for obtaining, 
presenting and preserving electronic data as evidence and
agreements on sharing evidence of those crimes witho o
international partners.
  Further attention to the problem of offshore financial centers.
  Establishing FIUs where we do not already have them to 
collect and analyze information on those engaged in money- 
laundering and liaise with the equivalent agencies in partner 
countries.
  Agreement on principles and the need for adequate legislation 
to facilitate asset confiscation from convicted criminals, 
including ways to help each other trace, freeze and confiscate 
those assets and, where possible, in accordance with national 
legislation, share seized assets with other nations.
Many of the next steps will be in the hands of the private 
sector. To protect themselves, private firms will necessarily have 
to intensify due diligence, internal compliance, and risk 
assessment efforts. Without such steps, major institutions will 
find themselves recurrently forced to take major losses of the 
kind that some international banks experienced this past August 
in Russia. During the months to come, such efforts will prove 
important in reducing the risk of one's institution becoming 
liable to others victimized by lack of transparency or by financial 
crime. It is far harder to be held civilly liable in civil litigation 
when one has adopted and implemented all relevant best 
practices. If one has not done so, the potential risk to suit by 
plaintiffs' lawyers can be profound. By contrast, having adopted 
best practices, a firm is in the position to more or less define 
whether its competitors have put in sufficient controls 
themselves.
Through this mechanism, an entire industry's practices can 
transform themselves quickly. We saw this in the US during the 
1980s. A few prosecutions of and civil suits against banks, their 
corporate officers, members of their boards of directors, and 
their outside auditors, asserting their liability for financial losses 
associated with the Savings and Loan Industry had an immediate 
prophylactic impact, intensifying their efforts to ensure they had 
practices in place to discourage fraud. The US has repeatedly 
found that criminal and civil action against private sector 
wrongdoers is a remarkably effective mechanism to transform 
industry wide standards of compliance. One obvious next 
candidate in the US for this mechanism, following the now 
notorious case of Carlos Salinas' use of Citibank in Mexico, 
would be the targeting of the private banking services offered by 
major international banks. On this, perhaps we will see more 
soon.
As we undertake these steps and others, we will not become 
'crash-proof, nor will we wipe out financial crime. We will have 
hardened our target to the attacks of the unscrupulous, made it 
harder for criminals and terrorists to get away with financial 
crimes when they occur, facilitated our ability to trace their 
assets and bring them to justice. If we are able to take the 
principles of 'know your customer' and transparency seriously, 
and make them universal principles that are universally 
implemented, we may even succeed in reducing the threat of 
instability to the worlds financial markets. ^
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